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One of the principal arguments in favor of abortion is that it is not
wrong because what is killed in abortion is not a person, and killing
nonpersons can be morally permissible. And the claim that what is killed in
abortion is not a person is defended by two types of arguments. One type is
basically a simple appeal to intuition. "How can a tiny being only a half
inch long have the same rights as a grown woman, isn't that incredible?"
The answer to such appeals to so-called intuition is to point out that
prejUdice may very well be mistaken for intuition. We have no reason to
believe that size and appearance are morally relevant properties, and to
discriminate between beings on the basis of non-morally relevant
properties is undue discrimination.
The second type of argument is more than an appeal to intuition or
prejUdice. The structure of this type of argument is, first to argue that one
must have some property or set of properties in order to be a person, and ,
then , to argue that human fetuses do not have that property or set of
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properties. More formally:
One is a person only if one has property F.
Human fetuses do not have property F.
Therefore, human fetus es are not persons.

Various candidates are put forward for property F. In this article I
consider what has recently become a popular position, namely, the
position that sentience is the criterion of moral standing, but that there are
degrees of moral standing in such a way that early abortions are
permissible but late abortions are usually not. I will argue that this position
is incorrect, and I will set out positive reasons to show that the human
embryo or fetus, from conception onwards, does have complete moral
standing and does have a right to life. First I would like to examine mOre
closely the general requirements for a criterion of personhood.
What is sometimes put forward as the standard argument in favor of the
position that human fetuses are persons in an argument based on the
similarity between successive stages in the development of the fetus in the
womb . Roger Wertheimer, in his 1971 article, "Understanding the
Abortion Argument", is frequently quoted . Summing up the so-called
conservative position , i.e., the position that human fetuses are persons and
therefore abortion is immoral, Wertheimer writes:
But I am inclined to suppose that the conservative is right, that going back stage
by stage from the infant to the zygote one will not find any differences between
successive stages significant enough to bear the enormous moral burden of
allowing wholesale slaughter at the earlier stage while categorically denying that
permission at the next stage.!

As a species of slippery slope argument , this argument has its difficulties .
Opponents of the pro-life position have pointed out that the fact the
differences between successive stages in the development of a being are not
significant does not show that there are no significant changes at all, that
there are none between non-successive stages in the development of that
being. Thus, Donald VanDeVeer writes:
More concretely, what impresses many persons who are neither abortionists nor
uncomfortably pregnant is that there are substantial differences between the early
fetal stages ... and the neonate. Early on, the embryo is quite indeterminately
formed , comparatively speaking; in the early fetal stages there is no heart or brain
function and no movement of limbs. The empirical differences between what we
may loosely designate as S2 or S3 < stage 2 or stage 3> and the neonate are
striking. 2

Analogies clarify the point VanDe Veer is making. The difference between
sanity and insanity is significant, and yet a person can gradually become
insane in such a way that the differences between any two successive
changes in that person's transformation will be slight, while the differences
between non-successive stages are significant.
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Issue is Sharpened

This point, however, only sharpens the issue. Granted , there are
differences - even significant differences - between the zygote and the
newborn . Are those differences morally relevant? That is, are they
significant in the way the pro-abortionist needs them to be? That is, are
these differences sufficient to ground the differential treatment acorded to
newborn babies on the one hand , and embryos or fetuses on the other
hand? When we compare an embryo in very early stages of development
with a newborn infant, the differences are marked; yet, there are also
important similarities. VanDe Veer focuses on the significant differences,
but one could also focus on significant similarities, such as being of the
same species, having the same genetic structure, having human parents,
and so on. The real question is: what differences and what similarities are
morally relevant? We need an argument which distinguishes morally
relevant differences and similarities from morally irrelevant differences
and similarities.
Moreover, this argument to distinguish the morally relevant from the
morally irrelevant cannot be based simply on an appeal to ordinary
language or linguistic conventions. That is, one cannot argue that fetuses
have no rights because they are not "persons", ifby that one means merely
that they lack characteristics which, according to the conventions of Qur
language, a thing must have in order to be called a person. 3 For, whatever
the linguistic conventions of our culture are - although I think, as a
matter offact, according to those linguistic conventions fetuses do qualify
as "persons" - one could always doubt whether those conventions are
morally correct. And so, whichever way one argues, ordinary language or
the linguistic conventions of our culture cannot by themselves settle the
issue.
One position, which seems to have gained some popularity lately in
philosophical circles, is presented as a moderate position, taking the
golden mean as it were between the so-called extremes of the conservative
and the liberal positions. L. W. Sumner speaks of it as the "third way" in
his book, Abortion and Moral Theory .4 Other representatives are S. I.
Benn 5 and Norman Gillespie.6 According to Sumner, what counts as a
benefit or a harm for a person is either the fact that its desires are satisfied
or frustrated, or the fact that it is brought to experience what it likes or
what it dislikes . From this premise, Sumner concludes that benefits and
harms for particular persons must be interpreted in terms of psychological
states, and that morality, which concerns harms and benefits, "can concern
itself only with beings who are conscious or sentient."7 For Sumner, then,
sentience is the criterion of moral standing. All sentient beings , i.e. , all
animals, have morlU standing. By a criterion of "moral standing", he
means a criterion by which one determines whether a being has a right to
life or not, although the strength of that right to life (according to Sumner)
may vary.
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According to Sumner there are degrees of moral standing, corresponding
to the degrees of sentience among various animals. "The animal kingdom
presents us with a hierarchy of sentience. Nonsentient beings have no
moral standing; among sentient beings the more developed have greater
standing than the less developed, the upper limit being occupied by the
paradigm of a normal adult human being."8 Again, "As the duties may
vary in strength, so may the corresponding rights . To have some moral
standing is to have some right to life, whether or not it may be overridden
by the rights of others. To have full moral standing is to have the strongest
right to life possessed by anyone, the right to life of a paradigm person."9
According to Sumner it is a great merit of this theory that "it seems to
accord reasonably well with most people's intuitions that in our moral
reasoning paramecia and horseflies count for nothing, dogs and cats count
for something, chimpanzees and dolphins count for more, and human
beings count for most of all." 10
Sumner's Conclusion

With this criterion, Sumner concludes that the fetus has no moral
standing at all in the first trimester of gestation, since in that period he or
she is presentient; that this organism begins to acquire moral standing in
the second trimester; and that the moral standing of the fetus in the third
trimester is roughly equal to the moral standing of the newborn infant. He
thus holds that abortion in the early stages of pregnancy is no different
than contraception, while abortion in the later stages of pregnancy may
have a moral quality approaching that of infanticide. Sumner favorably
describes this view of the status of the fetus as "gradual, differential, and
developmental."l0 He believes this approach accords much better with our
so-called commonsense intuitions.
The rhetorical appeal of this approach should not be underestimated.
Any position which can be presented as taking a virtuous mean, especially
on an issue about which highly emotional confrontations occur, has
tremendous appeal. People naturally fear outright confrontation and so a
moderate position, which allows one to say that one partly agrees with
each side without, of course, their alleged peculiar exaggerations, has an
emotional appeal beyond whatever intellectual appeal it may have.
The first point to inquire about is the basis for the position that sentience
is what confers inherent value on a thing. There can be little doubt that, at
least in some sense, it is the same organism which exists in the very early
stages of gestation, when the organism can be killed according to Sumner,
and in the later stages of gestation after birth, when because of the
organism's sentience, the organism ought not to be killed according to
Sumner. That is, according to Sumner, with respect to the same organism,
it is morally permissible to kill that organism at a certain time, but not
morally right to kill this organism at a later time. Clearly, then, on this view
it is not the organism itself which has inherent value, even during those
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times when it is not permissible to kill it. That is, the reason why one ought
not to kill the third trimester fetus and infants is not that the organism itself
has inherent value, but because his or her life is a necessary means for
realizing what does have inherent value. Thus, implicit in this view is the
position that life does not really have inherent value - that inherent value
is found in something else.
Thus, when Sumner argues that sentience is what confers moral
standing on a being, the position he takes , in effect, is that sentience, in its
various degrees, counting rationality as a type of developed sentience, is
the inherent value, in effect, the only inherent value.
As far as I can see, the only bases for this position are either hedonism or
dualism. Sumner himself explicitly appeals to a type of hedonism. He
argues that, properly speaking, benefits consist in the satisfaction of
conscious desires or the experience of what one likes. One also could hold
his position, or at least a position very close to it, on the basis of dualism.
Michael Tooley, for example, in his book Abortion and Infanticide,
argues in this manner. 12 The first step , then , in replying to the gradualist
position is to provide arguments, albeit brief, against hedonism and
dualism. The results of these arguments, however, will be more than
negative.
Refuting Hedonism
First, hedonism. Hedonism is the view that, not only are all inherent
goods pleasures and inherent bads pains , but what makes good things
inherently good is pleasure and what makes inherently bad things bad is
pain , that pleasure is the formalit y of good. Thus to refute hedonism one
need only show that there is a good that is not a pleasure . From that it will
follow that pleasure is not the formality of good. When we say that
something is good, we are saying that it is desirable , so if we can show that
there is a desirable which is not a pleasure and so not desired only because
it is a pleasure, then we will have shown that a good exists which is not a
pleasure or a means to a pleasure.
There are two types of pleasure. Some pleasures are simply sensations of
a certain type . Thus, someone can take a drug simply for the sake of the
sensation he gets from it. Another type of pleasure consists in the
satisfaction of a desire. Thus, solving a mathematical problem produces
pleasure, not as a type of sensation, but as a fulfillment of the desire for the
solution. Thus , I can work a mathematical problem for the sake of the
pleasure, the pleasure being the delight which comes with the solution. By
extension, the hedonist will say that I desire knowledge, not for its own
sake, but for the sake of the pleasure or joy which knowledge produces in
me.
Now, to refute hedonism , all one needs to show is that there is an object
which is desired which is not a pleasure in either of these senses , and it is
not means to a pleasure in either of these senses. It will then follow that
84

Linacre Quarterly

something is desirable which is not a pleasure or a means to pleasure, and
therefore that pleasure is not what makes good things good (what makes
desirable things desirable).
The example of the desire to solve a mathematical problem is, I think,
sufficient for our purposes. Clearly, this desire is not a desire for the sake of
a pleasure as a certain type of sensation. The hedonist, then, will have to
say that it is a desire for the pleasure or delight that consists in the
satisfaction of the desire. In many cases, the hedonist analysis of this desire
is partially correct; that is, in many cases we desire knowledge simply for
the sake of the satisfaction which comes from satisfying our desire. But the
problem is that this second-order desire, the desire to satisfy a desire, must
be parasitic on some first-order desire. And in the example we are
considering, the first-order desire cannot consist in a desire for a pleasure
in either of the senses explained above, since this first-order desire cannot
be for a particular type of sensation nor be itself a desire for the satisfaction
of still another desire.
Therefore, while the desire for knowledge can in some cases be the desire
for the pleasure which consists in the satisfaction of a desire, not every
desire for knowledge can be that. And so some instances of a desire for
knowledge are desires for knowledge for its own sake, desires for
knowledge for the sake of knowledge. Hence there is something desired
which is neither a pleasure nor a means to a pleasure. Therefore there is a
desirable object which is not a pleasure nor a means to a pleasure.
Therefore not every good is a pleasure or a means to a pleasure. Therefore
pleasure is not what makes good things good; pleasure is not the formality
of good .
Analyzing Desire for Knowledge
If we analyze the example of desire for knowledge for its own sake, I
think we will find it most plausible that we desire things simply because
they are fulfilling, because they are perfective or build us up . Of course, we
desire fulfillment not only for ourselves but for others as well- this is not
an egoistic principle. In any case, fulfillment, or perfection is what makes
good things good, i.e., is the formality of good.
Now, if value or inherent goodness consists in real fulfillment, then, if
the fulfillment of X is an inherent good, then the being of X must also he an
inherent good. That is, once we see that real fulfillment or perfection is the
formality of good, then whatever the entities are in whom inherent value or
good can inhere, they themselves, as well as their full flourishing, will be of
inherent value. It seems incoherent to hold that the fulfillment of X is
inherently valuable, but that X itself is not.
Now dualism. The dualist claims that the subject of understanding is a
non-bodily substance. This claim, however, seems inconsistent with the
unity of self of which one is immediately aware. I am immediately aware
that it is the same I that senses and understands. 13 Now, sensation is a
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bodily act. More specifically, sensation is a bodily affection, a bodily
alteration brought about in me by the physical action of the thing on my
sense organ. Since what a thing does and undergoes reveals what sort of
thing it is, and since it is the same I that senses and understands, it follows
that the I which understands is not simply a spiritual thing, not a
consciousness using a body, but a bodily thing itself, an organism.
To the objection that sensation may be a spiritual action performed by
my consciousness, at the initiation of a bodily stimulus, a'la Descartes'
analysis of sensation, one can reply that conscious sensation is different
only in degree from quasi-conscious and unconscious (i.e. , non-reflexive)
sensation. Unconscious sensation is certainly bodily in nature (and not just
stimulated by a bodily change), and so, it seems most reasonable to hold ,
so is quasi-conscious and conscious sensation. The conclusion is that a
human being is an organism, and is so essentially. Human beings are
special types of organisms.
Together, these points show that the gradualist position is incoherent.
For since real fulfillment is the formality of good , then whatever the beings
are which have inherent value, they themselves and not just their
experiences have inherent value. It is incoherent to hold that the
flourishing of X is inherently good , but not X itself. Thus, if we consider a
healthy human adult, the paradigm case, as they say, of someone who has a
right to life, then that human being himself or herself is inherently valuable
and not just that person's experiences. But, secondly, as I also argued
above, the human being is essentially an organism. Therefore, the time at
which the human organism comes to be is the same time at which the
human being comes to be. So, if X is a human being, then X came to be
when the human organism which X is came to be.
Add a Proposition

Now let us add the following moral proposition, which is, at the very
least, very plausible. If X is inherently valuable, and it is wrong directly to
kill X at a certain time, then, other things being equal, it is also wrong
directly to kill X at some previous time. So, to take myself as an example, if
it is wrong directly to kill me today, then, other things being equal, it would
have been wrong directly to kill me at any previous time. In particular,
since I am an organism, and the organism comes to be at conception, the
being that existed in my mother's womb 37 years ago is the same being that
I am today. Therefore it would have been wrong directly to kill that being
in my mother's womb 37 years ago . 14
Let us now return to the question regarding which similarities between
different beings are morally relevant, and which are morally irrelevant for
whether a being has moral standing. I have not yet provided a general
criterion for distinguishing between those. Rather, I have argued that
being the same thing at an earlier time must certainly be a morally relevant
similarity. It would take a great deal more time to defend a general
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criterion of moral standing, but I would like to set out, at least, what I
think is the criterion, and try to explain it very briefly.
Let me also add that my argument against the gradualist position does
not logically depend on this part of the paper. For, regardless of what the
correct moral tandard is, if the argument up to this point is correct, it
establishes that human embryos or fetuses have the same basic rights as
normal adult human beings. Nevertheless, psychologically, if one holds
that sentience is the criterion of moral standing (and hence that all animals
have moral standing) there is considerable pressure to admit degrees into
moral standing, in the way Sumner does.
Being a member of the human species is not the criterion of moral
standing. Being a member of the human species is a sufficient condition,
but it is not a necessary condition for having moral standing. If intelligent
life from another planet landed on earth, we would owe it moral respect
also.
I would say that every rational agent, or every free agent, has moral
standing. When one begins to deliberate about what one ought to do, one
spontaneously recognizes that some objects are worth pursuing for their
own sake, such objects as life, knowledge, friendship, and so on. These are
the objects of our natural inclinations, the objects that are fulfilling or
perfective, and recognized as intrinsically, not just instrumentally, good.
Such objects or basic goods are not just goods for me, but for others as
well. But the objects in question are objects of practical reason and choice,
i.e., they are possibilities for a rational, free agent. This is not to say that
they are good only when pursued by reason and choice, for my life is good
even while I am sleeping and knowledge is good even when reached
spontaneously and not by choice. But in these beginnings of practical or
moral reasoning, I apprehend not that life in general is good, but that the
sort oflife which can be an object of rational pursuit is an intrinsic goOd. 15
Defending Criterion

This criterion can be defended in the following way. Nonrational
animals, inasmuch as the principle of their actions is exterior, are more
similar to other sorts of beings, than they are to persons. Since they lack
free choice, what actions they perform are completely determined by the
kind of stimulus put before them, and so what goals their actions will be
directed to are determined by others. In this sense they are like natural
slaves: someone else, necessarily, selects their goals for them. They are, as it
were, by nature instruments. Free agents, on the other hand, have the
capacity to select their own goals , and so it makes sense to say that their
concerns should be taken into account. 16
When I say that it is the goods of free agents that generate moral
responsibilities, what I mean is free agents as concrete things or
substances. Moreover, the goods which I must pursue and respect are
fundamentally aspects of what persons can be, i.e., they are various
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potentialities or possibilities to which persons are naturally oriented.
Therefore, whenever the thing, or substance, comes to be which has these
basic potentialities, then it is that a being exists which demands moral
respect.
And so, by "free agent" I mean a thing which has the potentiality to
pursue the various personal goods rationally or freely. Since human
persons are organisms, they come to be at conception, and from that
moment onward they have the active potentiality to realize all of the
fulfillments of a human being, although it may take them some time to
actualize those potentialities. The important point of morality is that life,
knowledge, friendship, and so on, are possibilities or potentialities for this
very being even though it may take this being even many years to actualize
those potentialities. (It also is worth noting that they are even now actively
developing themselves to the point at which they will realize these
perfections. )
Finally, the argument is not that they potentially have those
characteristics which confer personhood. To have such characteristics
only potentially would mean that they have personhood only potentially.
Nor is the point that they are potential persons and therefore have rights.
Rather, being a thing which has the potentiality to rationally pursue these
various goods is what confers actual personhood, and human embryos and
fetuses have that characteristic actually not just potentially.
Why, someone might object, should having the same potentiality as
adult humans give embryos, fetuses and infants the same moral ~tatus as
adults? Shouldn't what a thing does actually, count more than what it has
the potentiality for? Why should we be concerned so much with
potentiality? The answer - and I think it is a very important point for this
whole controversy - is that our actions, our choices , primarily bear upon
potentialities, on what can or could be. If I kill someone I do not, strictly
speaking, take away from them their actuality. It is too late to deprive them
of what they have been or what they are. My action, rather, deprives them
of what they could have been, it brings it about that they will never
actualize their possibilities. In other words, it is too late to deprive them of
their past or present; if I kill them, what I deprive them of is their future.
And so our actions and our choices bear primarily upon potentialities.
Therefore, killing an unborn child is, in this respect, worse than killing an
adult, because it robs from him or her more of his or her life.

References
I. Wertheimer, Roger, "Understanding the Abortion Argument," Philosophy and
Public Affairs I (1971), reprinted in Joel Feinberg, ed. , The Problem of Abortion. 2nd ed.
(Belmont, California, Wadsworth, 1984), 43ff.
2. VanDeVeer, Donald, "Justifying 'Wholesale Slaughter' ", in Feinberg, op. cit., 68.
3. Warren. Mary Ann, "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion ," Feinberg,
102-119.

88

Linacre Quarterly

4. Sumner, L. W. , Abortion and Moral Theory (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton,
1981). An excerpt is reprinted in Feinberg, op. cit., 71-93.
5. Feinberg, 135-144.
6. Ibid., 94-10 I.
7. Ibid. , 79.
8. Ibid., 83.
9. Ibid., 74; cf. Sumner's book cited in note 4, pp. 124-160.
10. Feinberg, 84.
II. Ibid., 73 .
12. Tooley, Michael, Abortion and Infanticide (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983).
13. This argument is proposed by Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, PI. I, Question
76, Article I.
14. The reason I have the "other things equal" clause added in the proposition above is
only because my argument in this paper has not established what the correct normative
ethical principles are. So, the argument by itself does not rule out , say, consequentialism or
situationism, although I think both those theories are false . But what the argument
establishes, if it is correct, is that the human embryo or fetus is something whose life must be
respected , in whatever way the correct normative ethical principles indicate that personal
life must be respected .
15. Cf. Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, Beyond the New Morality, 3rd ed . (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1988), chapters 7-9.
16. St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book III , Chapter 112.

May, 1990

89

